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War of Words or a Regional Disaster?
The (I1) Legality of Israeli and Iranian
Military Options
By BEHNAM GHARAGOZLI*
Israel is a "germ of corruption" that will be "removed soon."1
- President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
"Two thousand kilometers." 2
-Former IDF Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz on how far Israel would
go to stop Iran's nuclear program. Two thousand kilometers is the
distance between Iran and Israel.
I. Introduction
The above two quotes are a microcosm of the current war of
words between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the
intensity of the verbal exchanges between the two rivals grows, so
does the importance of analyzing the current Israeli-Iranian enmity.
This note sets out to answer two questions: (1) Whether Israel has
the right to attack Iran out of self-defense, and reciprocally; (2)
whether Iran has the right to attack Israel out of self-defense.
While the first question has been on the minds of many
policymakers in the West for quite some time, few have seriously
considered the second. Understandably, many readers may be
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
The author would like to thank Professor George Bisharat and Professor Ron
Hassner for their invaluable help in this project.
1. Ahmadinejad: Israel Is a Germ of Corruption That Will Be Removed,
Haaretz, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1013733.html.
2. Israel v. Iran, Economist, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.
economist.com/World/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?storyid = 5420675.
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taken aback by a work that even poses such a question. Many
readers may be baffled by the notion that the Islamic Republic of
Iran, a state seen by many as a pariah in the Middle East and the
West, might have a right to self-defense against a United States ally.
It is for this very reason that this paper will analyze the question. To
be genuinely objective in evaluating the current rivalry between the
two regional powers in the Middle East, it is necessary to pose the
question on both sides. This paper will argue that while neither side
may legally invoke the right of preemption or Article 51 self-
defense, there is ample evidence to suggest that Iran has more
reason to fear an Israeli conventional attack on its nuclear
installations than Israel has to fear an Iranian nuclear attack on its
civilian population.
This note is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the reader
to the standard of review. Specifically, this section will identify the
legal requirements an acting nation-state must satisfy in order to
launch an attack under the right of preemption and/or Article 51.
In discussing the right of preemption, the reader may find it
interesting that the right in fact did not begin with the Bush
Doctrine. Rather, the right of preemption originated out of an
incident between the United States and Great Britain more than a
century and a half before the Bush Doctrine. Part I will also discuss
the relevant criticisms lodged at the current Bush Doctrine (which
seeks to loosen the requirements of traditional preemption), and
whether Iran or Israel may cite the Bush Doctrine to justify a
preemptive strike.
Part II will provide the reader with a brief background of the
relations between Israel and Iran ever since the overthrow of
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. This will put the current enmity
into its proper context, and demonstrate that the rivalry grew out of
geopolitical realities rather than a shift in ideologies.
Part III will evaluate Israel's right to self-defense against Iran
under both the theory of preemption and Article 51. The right of
preemption analysis will focus on the prospect of an Iranian nuclear
attack on Israel3 while the Article 51 analysis will focus on
3. Although Iran is capable of launching a conventional attack against Israel
with its Shahab III missiles, an extensive analysis of whether this threat is
"imminent" is not required as Iran has had these missiles for at least ten years now
(see infra section IV) and has not used them against Israel. Iran has not, however,
had a nuclear capability. If Iran does come to possess a nuclear weapon, however,
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responding to Iran's funding of Hezbollah and Hamas. In spite of
Iran's aggressive rhetoric, ongoing nuclear program, and support of
Hezbollah and Hamas, this paper concludes that Israel may not
legally strike Iran under the Caroline Affair or Article 51.
Part IV will discuss perhaps the most controversial issue of this
work: The question of an Iranian right of self-defense against Israel.
The right of preemption will be analyzed with respect to preventing
an Israeli air assault on Iran's nuclear reactors4 while the Article 51
analysis will focus on Israel's funding of Iranian opposition groups
and its recent covert war against Iran. Applying the same standard
as in Part III, this paper argues that in spite of Israel's express and
aggressive rhetoric, support for Iranian opposition groups, reports
of assassinations of Iranian scientists, attempts to acquire the
esoterically requisite military wherewithal to attack Iran's facilities
and the performance of military exercises to prepare for such an
attack against Iran, Iran may not conduct a legal preemptive or
Article 51 attack against Israel.
II. Setting the Standard of Review
A. Right of Self-defense Under Article 51
All members of the United Nations enjoy rights and privileges
(as well as responsibilities) under the United Nations Charter
("Charter"). As such, Article 51 of the Charter provides that
"[niothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations."5 Therefore, to attack out
of traditional self-defense, a nation-state must have suffered an
it may pose an imminent threat against Israel. The same reasoning applies
reciprocally as to why an Iranian conventional attack against Israel's nuclear
reactors is not needed as Israel has had nuclear capabilities for decades now. See
Trita Parsi, Israel's 'Auto-pilot' Policy on Iran, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 8, 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/MiddleEast/IL08Ak1.html.
4. While Israel is also capable of attacking Iran with nuclear weapons, such a
threat is likely not "imminent" as Israel has had this capability for several decades
now and has not used it against Iran. However, the development of an Iranian
nuclear weapon would be a change in the status quo that may alter the dynamics of
the rivalry in which Israel may pose an imminent threat to Iran in Israel's desire to
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear capabilities. Interview with Ron Hassner,
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley (2008).
5. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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"armed attack."6
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in Nicaragua v. United
States held that an "armed attack" does not include "assistance to
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other
support," but it did, however, note that an armed attack also
includes "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, who carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to [an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces] ."7
B. Legalizing Preemption: The Caroline Affair
Defining the standard of when a State may invoke the right of
preemption is a bit difficult as the right finds no explicit
endorsement in any treaty. To establish the right, we must therefore
look to customary international law, which "consists of rules of law
derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief
that the law required them to act that way."8 Custom is thus created
by state practice and accompanying opinio juris (state acceptance of
that practice as a legal obligation).9
The right of preemptive strike was accepted as custom as early
as the nineteenth century and arose out of the Caroline Affair. The
Caroline Affair laid out two requirements for anticipatory self-
defense: (1) Imminent necessity; and (2) proportionality.
In 1837, a group of Canadian rebels seeking to democratize
Canada were forced to flee to Navy Island and establish
headquarters there.10 Using the steamboat SS Caroline ("Caroline"),
the Americans supplied the rebels with men, arms and other
supplies." To end such support, the British reacted by seizing the
Caroline overnight, setting it on fire and casting it adrift over
Niagara Falls, killing two men in the process.12 Subsequent to the
incident, tensions rose between the United States and Britain, and
6. Id.
7. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
8. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984).
9. Id.
10. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 53 (2006).
11. Id. See generally Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-
Defence in Contemporary International Law, 1(2) MISKOLC J. INT'L L. 104-20 (2004),
available at http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/wwwdrint/20042rouillardl.htm.
12. Byers, supra note 10, at 53.
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diplomatic letters were exchanged between the British Prime
Minister, Lord Ashburton and the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel
Webster.' 3 Webster wrote that the use of force in self-defense could
be justified in situations "in which the necessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment of deliberation." 14 Additionally, Webster declared that
nothing "unreasonable or excessive" could be done in self-defense. 15
To show imminent necessity, the nation-state invoking the right
must show that "the use of force by the other [S]tate was imminent
and that there was essentially nothing but forcible action that would
forestall such attack." 6  To demonstrate that the force was
reasonable and not excessive, the force conducted out of self-defense
must be proportional to the danger the State seeks to avoid.17 A
State is justified only in using the amount of force that is necessary
to deter an attack.'8
Since the Caroline Affair, governments throughout the
international community have come to accept the two criteria of
imminent necessity and proportionality as the parameters of a new
international right of anticipatory self-defense.' 9
C. Anticipatory Self-defense Survives the U.N. Charter
Treaties are "instruments binding at international law [that are]
concluded between international entities. .... "20 To be considered a
treaty, the contracting parties must have intended to create legal
rights and duties; the agreement must be concluded by states or
international organizations with treaty-making authority; must be
13. Id.
14. Id. at 54.
15. Id.
16. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military
Force, 26(2) THE WASH. QUARTERLY 89, 91 (2003), available at http://www.twq.com
/03spring/docs/03spring-arend.pdf.
17. Id. at 91.
18. Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International
Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L L. & CoMP. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004).
19. Roxana Vatanparast, International Law Versus the Preemptive Use of Force:
Racing to Confront the Specter of a Nuclear Iran, 31 HASTINGS INTr'L L. & CoMP. L. REV.
783, 787 (2008); International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences (Oct. 6, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947).
20. U.N. Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference Guide, at 3, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
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governed by international law; and must generally be in written
form.21
Although the right of anticipatory self-defense finds no specific
endorsement in any treaty, it is important to determine whether the
general provisions of the Charter allow nation-states in the post-
Charter era to invoke the right. Article 2(4) of the Charter indicates
that there is a presumption against the use of force.22 Specifically, it
states that U.N. Member States must "refrain... from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any [S]tate." 23 Article 2(3) demands that all States "settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."24
The prohibition against the use of force, however, is not
absolute. The Charter provides for two explicit exceptions to the
prohibition: (1) Force authorized by the U.N. Security Council, and
(2) force used in self-defense. 25 As such, Article 51 indicates that the
Charter "shall [not] impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations." 26
Whether the right of anticipatory self-defense that arose out of
the Caroline Affair survived the Charter depends upon one's
interpretation of Article 51. On the one hand, it has been argued
that Article 51 requires that an act of self-defense by a Member State
only occur after an armed attack is carried out against that State.27
This restrictive interpretation goes on to declare that the Charter
supercedes rights of self-defense that existed before the Charter (i.e.,
anticipatory self-defense).28
A more liberal reading of Article 51 argues that because it uses
the phrase "inherent right of ... self-defense," it seems to implicitly
adopt the pre-Charter right of self-defense such as preemptive strike
as long as they have a basis in customary international law.29
21. Id.
22. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
23. Id.
24. See id. para. 3.
25. See id. art. 51.
26. Id.
27. Byers, supra note 10, at 73.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has declared that States
"retain" the inherent right of self-defense under the Charter.30 The
more prevailing view indicates that "anticipatory self-defense is
permissible but traditionally has required the existence of an
imminent threat."31 Those that support the right of anticipatory self-
defense insist that invoking the right is "limited by the requirements
of necessity and proportionality set out in the Caroline case." 32
State practice has also supported the more liberal reading of
Article 51. The Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force at the
commencement of the 1967 War provides one such example as it
was not condemned by the U.N. Security Council or most States.33
Further, judges of the ICJ have rejected the conservative
interpretation. Judge Higgins argues that "[tihere is... nothing in
the text of Article 51 that.., stipulates that self-defence is available
only when an armed attack is made by a State." 34  Judge
Buergenthal asserts that the U.N. Charter, "in affirming the inherent
right of self-defence does not make its exercise dependent upon an
armed attack by another State."35
It should be noted, however, that advocates of both
interpretations of Article 51 agree that under the Charter, a
"unilateral preemptive force without an imminent threat is clearly
unlawful."36 This note adopts the more liberal reading of Article 51
to include not only the right of self-defense in response to an
"armed attack" but also the right of anticipatory self-defense.
30. Kofi Annan, The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly, New
York (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/
sg2eng030923.htm.
31. Steven C. Welsh, Preemptive War and International Law, CENTER FOR DEF.
INFO., Dec. 5, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm.
32. Arend, supra note 16, at 96.
33. For a description of the international reaction to the Israeli strike, see
Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards the Legal Aspects of the Use of
Force, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442-43 (A. Cassese
ed., 1986) (contrasting the reactions to the 1967 attack on Egypt and the 1981 attack
on Osirak).
34. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 215 (July 9).
35. Id. at 242.
36. Arend, supra note 16, at 89.
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D. Neither Side May Invoke the Bush Doctrine
In 2002, the Bush Administration attempted to revise the
standard for anticipatory self-defense. Pointing to the need to adapt
the right of preemptive use of force to be able to combat today's
adversaries 37 and address the new threats of weapons of mass
destruction ("WMDs") and terrorism, 38 President Bush advocated
"confronting the worst threats before they emerge." 39 Under the
Bush Doctrine, the preventive use of force is valid and necessary in
light of the new threats that the world faces.40 The Bush Doctrine
can appropriately be characterized as the "preventive" use of force
doctrine as it condones the use of force without the showing of an
imminent threat. The Bush Doctrine has also been called a
preventive doctrine rather than a preemptive doctrine, because the
Bush Doctrine advocates that a State should strike when the threat is
distant as it may be more difficult to eliminate the threat once it is
more imminent.41 As argued below, however, it is apparent that the
Bush Doctrine is not only unnecessary and dangerous as a matter of
public policy, but is also illegal.
1. The Bush Doctrine is Unnecessary and Dangerous
The international concern for WMDs and terrorism, although
worrisome, is not sufficient to justify relaxing the traditional
international law requirements set out in the Caroline Affair. WMDs
are not a novel problem that the international community has
simply ignored. In fact, as early as 1899, a treaty on poison gas was
established.42 The United Nations has been creating institutions to
address nuclear weapons since the 1950s (i.e., the International
Atomic Energy Agency).
It has also been convincingly argued that relaxing the
traditional requirements for preemptive strike would ironically
37. See GlobalSecurity.org, National Security Strategy Report - September 2002,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.htm
(last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
38. Arend, supra note 16, at 89.
39. George W. Bush, Former President of the United States, Commencement
Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York Uune 1,
2002), available at http:/ /www.dartmouth.edu/-govdocs/ docs/iraq/060102.pdf.
40. Byers, supra note 10, at 75.
41. George E. Bisharat, Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the
Confrontation with Iraq, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 46 (2003).
42. Byers, supra note 10, at 75.
[33.1
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make the world a more dangerous place.43 The Bush Doctrine
creates broad rights of preemptive, or more accurately, preventive
use of force. Such rights create uncertainties in three crucial areas:
(1) Who would decide whether a potential threat justifies the use of
force in self-defense; (2) whether the preemptive use of force would
merely create the pretense for "opportunistic military
intervention[s]"; and (3) whether the same broad rights would apply
to all countries as customary international law requires.44
These concerns stem at least partially from the fact that the
United States, the creator of the Bush Doctrine, has itself been in
violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") in its
efforts to "develop battlefield nuclear weapons designed to...
destroy dangerous chemicals and weapons." 45 The Bush Doctrine
makes it difficult to determine the threshold required under
international law for the use of force.46 After all, if mere possession
of nuclear weapons suffices to justify the use of force against a
sovereign State, then would not India have the right to preemptively
strike Pakistan and vice versa?47  Could not various States
throughout the world preemptively target the United States, Great
Britain, France, China and Russia, as they all have nuclear
weapons?48 If the Bush Doctrine were to be declared customary
international law, the right would be available to every sovereign
State, not just the ones of the United States' choosing. As such, it is
clear that the Bush Doctrine would at the very least open a
Pandora's box, and at worst provide the foundation for utter chaos
throughout the international community.
The United Nations has supported these views. In 2004, the
U.N. Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, along with a group of former prime ministers, foreign
ministers, and ambassadors, all expressed disapproval of the Bush
Doctrine:
The short answer is that if there are good arguments for
preventive military action, with good evidence to support them,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 76.
45. Id. at 75.
46. Id.




Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize
such action if it chooses .... For those impatient with a response,
the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential
threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-
intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great
for the legality of unilateral preventive action... to be accepted.
Allowing one to so act is to allow all.
49
2. The Bush Doctrine is Illegal
The Bush Doctrine essentially seeks to replace the existing
customary international law of preemption. 50 Currently, there is no
such widespread acceptance of the Bush Doctrine throughout the
international community nor is there any treaty endorsing it.
Therefore, the Bush Doctrine is illusory at best and illegal at worst.
As Professor Joel Paul has persuasively argued:
Two of the fundamental requirements of any international legal
doctrine are that it must first be applicable to all parties, and
second, it cannot derogate from the essential state structure of the
international legal system. If the Bush Doctrine is read as a non-
reciprocal rule - that the U.S. alone may prevent war by attacking
other states that are developing weapons of mass destruction -
then it is not a doctrine of law, it is simply a unilateral assertion of
power. Conversely, if the Bush Doctrine is read as conferring on
all states the authority to act to prevent war, then every state's
territorial sovereignty is threatened, and no practical limit on
violence is retained: Pakistan is as justified as India in attacking its
neighbor to prevent a possible future use of nuclear weapons;
Iran, Iraq, Israel and Syria have license to attack each other to
prevent the acquisition of weapons technologies. Such a rule
would be wholly incompatible with the fundamental principle of
minimizing violence. For the Bush Doctrine to be accepted as law,
its proponents must articulate some limiting principle other than
non-reciprocity.
51
The flaws of the Bush Doctrine are perhaps best exemplified by
Iranian-Israeli relations. The need to comply with international law
49. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report
of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 190-91,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld.
50. To do this, the Bush Doctrine would have to obtain sufficient state practice
and accompanying opiniojuris.
51. Paul, supra note 18, at 458.
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is especially imperative here. If either Iran or Israel refuses to do so,
it will contribute to destabilization in the region and weaken the
force of international law. It follows then that neither Iran nor Israel
may invoke the Bush Doctrine to justify a preemptive strike against
the other under international law. As a result, this paper will apply
the traditional requirements for preemptive strike52 as the standard
of review.
III. A Brief Background of Iranian-Israeli Relations
A. The Cold War Era
When the Shah of Iran was overthrown, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini maintained the Shah's regional ambitions but planned to
use Islam as the means of achieving them (i.e., exporting the Islamic
revolution).53  Despite the anti-Zionist rhetoric of Khomeini's
revolutionary regime, Israel felt that it could not afford to lose Iran
as an ally and in fact maintained its doctrine of periphery to check
its Arab neighbors and the Soviet threat.54 Israel even provided Iran
with weapons throughout the Iran-Iraq war and convinced the
United States to do the same.55 Iran's policy towards Israel seemed
to be "rhetorical opposition to Israel but practical collaboration." 56
B. Post-Cold War
With the rise of Israel's Labor Party to power, Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin began to depict Iran as a threat in order to advance
52. The traditional requirements include a demonstration that the use of force
by the other state is imminent and that essentially nothing but forcible action that
would forestall such an attack (imminent necessity).
53. TRITA PARSI, TREACHEROUS ALLIANCE: THE SECRET DEALINGS OF ISRAEL, IRAN
AND THE U.S. 87 (2007).
54. Interview by Trita Parsi with Israel's former Minister of Finance Dan
Meridor, Tel Aviv, (Oct. 27, 2004); Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle (New York:
Free Press, 1988), 4; Gary Sick, October Surprise (New York: Random House, 1991),
61-63; Israel Shahak, "How Israel's Strategy Favors Iraq over Iran," Middle East
International, March 19, 1993, 19; Interview by Trita Parsi with Yossi (Joseph)
Alpher, former Mossad official and senior advisor to Ehud Barak, Tel Aviv, (Oct.
27, 2004); Joseph Alpher, "Israel and the Iraq-Iran War," in The Iraq-Iran War:
Impact and Implications, ed. Efraim Karsh (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), 157-159.
55. Parsi, supra note 53, at 95;Phone interview by Trita Parsi with Nader
Entessar, (Jan. 25, 2005); Sick, supra note 54, at 114, 200.
56. ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI, AFTER KHOMEINI (New York: Routledge, 1995),
2010]
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his "New Middle East" ambitions in which Israel would play a
central role in regional affairs in the Middle East.
57
Iran, fearing isolation, opposed the Oslo peace process partly as
a result of being excluded.58 While the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee ("AIPAC") successfully lobbied the Clinton
Administration and Congress to halt all U.S. trade with Iran, Israel
itself never did.59 It was subsequently discovered that Israel's trade
with Iran after the U.S. trade ban not only continued but included a
weapons trade.60
Then Iranian President Khatami attempted to improve relations
with the European Union and the United States. Meanwhile, then
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu grew worried about
Iran's nuclear program and began to demonize Iran.61 Succeeding
Netanyahu, then Prime Minister Ehud Barak's Administration
rejected Khatami's offers to initiate dialogue. 62 Throughout the
second intifada, Iran provided only vocal support to Palestinian
resistance groups such as Islamic Jihad but refused to support them
monetarily or militarily. 6
3
In 2003, Iran offered Israel a plan in which the two states would
respect each other's spheres of influence and stay out of each other's
hair.64 If the United States and Israel reversed their isolation policy
on Iran, Tehran would modify its behavior on several key issues,
including Israel. 65 Iran would significantly moderate its position on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by adopting a "Malaysian" or
"Pakistani" profile; that is, it would be an Islamic State that would
not recognize Israel, would occasionally criticize Israel, but would
completely avoid confronting or challenging Israel, either directly or
via proxies. 66 Under the agreement, "Iran would also pressure
57. Parsi, supra note 53, at 159-61.
58. Id. at 175.
59. Id. at 185-89.
60. Id. at 210.
61. Id. at 206-07.
62. Israel Rejects Talks with Iran: Former FM, XINHUA (China), Sep. 26, 2000.
63. Parsi, supra note 53, at 221-22.
64. Id. at 250-51.
65. Interview with Masoud Eslami, Iranian Foreign Ministry, in Tehran, Iran
(Aug. 23, 2004), in Parsi, supra note 54, at 175.
66. Interview with Mahmoud Sariolghalam, Professor, Shahid Beheshti Univ.,
Adviser to Iranian Nat'l Sec. Advisor, in Tehran, Iran (Aug. 2004), in Parsi, supra
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groups such as Hezbollah to refrain from provoking Israel." 67
As Parsi asserts, "[I]n return, Israel would cease to oppose a
U.S.-Iran rapprochement and would recognize Iran's role in the
region, while the United States would also end its policy of isolating
Iran, and accommodate a key Iranian role in the security of the
Persian Gulf."68 Israel rejected the Iranian offer, reasoning that Iran
did not have an interest in Israel, but was only seeking to improve
relations with the United States, after which it would continue to
counter Israel.69
In 2007, Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") reported that Iran was operating "3,000
uranium-enriching centrifuges capable of producing fissile material
for nuclear weapons." 70 However, the IAEA has also said that Iran
had operated its centrifuges "well below their capacity," and that "it
had not discovered any evidence that Iran was enriching to the level
that would produce bomb-grade fuel." 71 Further, Mr. ElBaradei
reported that there was simply no evidence of Iran developing
nuclear weapons.72 The CIA has also asserted that it would take
Iran a decade to develop nuclear weapons if it sought to do so. 73
IV. An Israeli Strike Against Iran Would Be Illegal
A. Israel Bears the Burden of Proof to Demonstrate Legality
The ICJ has held that it "is a general principle of law, confirmed
by the jurisprudence of this Court, that a party which advances a
note 53, at 173.
67. Parsi, supra note 53, at 251.
68. Id.
69. Interview by Trita Parsi with Menashe Amir, head of the Israeli Radio's
Persian Service, in Jerusalem, (Oct. 24, 2004).
70. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes/2007/12/O4/world/
middleeast/04intel.htm? r=l&sq=iran&st=cse.
71. William J. Broad, The Thin Line Between Civilian and Military Nuclear
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
12/05/world/middleeast/05weapons.ht-ml?ref=Washington&p.
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point of fact in support of its claim must establish that fact." 74 In
order to later justify a preemptive or Article 51 strike against Iran,
the burden of proof would be on Israel's shoulders to prove that it
had met the applicable legal requirements at the time of the attack.
B. Israel is Unable to Satisfy the Imminent Necessity Requirement
to Preemptively Strike Iran
The Deputy National Security Advisor under former Prime
Minister Ehud Barak has stated sarcastically, "[r]emember... the
Iranians are always five to seven years from the bomb. Time passes
but they're always five to seven years from the bomb." 75 Iran's
controversial nuclear program is perhaps the most often-cited
justification for an Israeli (and American) preemptive strike on
Iran.76 Given Israel's Operation Opera in 1981 that destroyed
Saddam's Osirak nuclear reactor and Operation Orchard that
targeted a Syrian nuclear reactor on September 6, 2007, it is only
natural to see a few parallels with the present study.
1. Iran's Nuclear Program Does Not Create an Imminent Necessity.
Because Israel's Operation Opera was severely condemned by
the international community 77 and Operation Orchard was mostly
met with silence,78 Israel cannot cite to those instances as
justification for a legal preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
The Iranian nuclear program and Iran's claimed ability to reach
Israel in a missile attack 79 does not provide Israel with sufficient
justification to meet the imminent necessity requirement for the
following four reasons.
74. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), 2008 I.C.J. (May 23), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pd.
75. Parsi, supra note 3.
76. JEROME R. CORSI, ATOMIC IRAN: How THE TERRORIST REGIME BOUGHT THE BOMB
AND AMERICAN POLITICANS (WND BOOKS 2005); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION:
A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS, 174-89 (W.W. NORTON & COMPANY 2006).
77. S.C. Res. 487, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
78. Richard Weitz, Israeli Airstrike in Syria: International Reactions, CNS, Nov. 1,
2007, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/071101.htm.
79. Zahra Hosseinian, Iran Test-Fires New Missile, Israel Within Reach, REUTERS,
Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4AB1
WG20081112?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
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First, Iran is a signatory to the NPT80 and under Article IV,
Paragraph 1 has the inalienable right to "develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes... in
conformity with Articles I and II of [the NPT]."81 In 2003, Iran
signed an additional protocol that allows IAEA inspectors "access to
individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and
development locations."82 Under the NPT, "non-nuclear weapons
states are allowed to acquire nuclear technology for civil purposes
[while committing] themselves not to build a bomb," 83 and agreeing
to international inspections of their facilities.84
As of the writing of this note, there is no hard evidence that Iran
has violated its treaty obligations under the NPT.85 Although the
Iranian nuclear program accelerated in the late 1990s, after two and
a half years of intrusive inspections, the IAEA was not able to find
evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, the
IAEA has not been able to confirm that the Iranian program is
entirely peaceful.86 The IAEA has been conducting inspections on
Iranian facilities since 2002.87 It has not found evidence that Iran
possesses nuclear weapons,88 or has enriched the amount of
80. Federation of American Scientists, Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/
control/npt/text/ npt3.htm (last visited Jan 14, 2009).
81. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729
U.N.T.S. 161, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
Others/infcircl40.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
82. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, IAEA Doc. Gov/2005/87 (Nov. 18,
2005), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/
gov2005-87.pdf.
83. Paul Reynolds, The American Hostility Towards Iran, BBC NEwS, Feb. 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6291091.stm.
84. David Krieger, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament, NUCLEAR AGE
PEACE FOUND., Feb. 2006, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/02/
00_kriegeriran-law-disarmament.htm.
85. Vatanparast, supra note 19, at 798. For a more extensive analysis on the
IAEA's evidence of Iran's nuclear program, please see Vatanparast's article in full.
86. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (February 4, 2006), available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.
87. Arms Control Association: Fact Sheets, http://www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/Iran-IAEA-Issues.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
88. Jason Ditz, IAEA: No Proof Iran Has Nuclear Weapons Program, ANTIWAR,
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uranium or plutonium necessary to build a bomb.89 While IAEA
inspectors have found some evidence indicative of Iran's intentions
of developing nuclear weapons, Mr. ElBaradei has qualified these
findings by indicating that "there's a big difference between
acquiring the knowledge for enrichment and developing a bomb." 90
Because Iran has not been found to have violated the NPT, Iran
has the right to enrich uranium to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle
for peaceful purposes under the NPT.91 Further, Iran announced in
January 2008 that it would cooperate with the international
community on its nuclear program.92
Claims that Iranian uranium enrichment must be for weapons
capability because of Iran's rich oil reserves93 ignore the empirical
evidence of Iran's energy output and consumption. During the
Shah's regime, Iran consumed 800,000 barrels of the six million
barrels of oil it produced each day, and exported the rest for profit.94
Today, Iran consumes two million barrels of the four million barrels
it produces each day.95 The reason for the increase in consumption
can be attributed to Iran's population doubling in the past thirty
years.96 Because oil exports make up a substantial amount of
revenue for Iran, it makes sense to offset its own oil consumption
Sept. 17, 2009, http://news.antiwar.com/2009/09/17/iaea-no-concrete-proof-iran-
has-nuclear-weapons-program.
89. See William J. Broad & Elaine Sciolino, Report Raises New Doubts on Iran
Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/16/world/middleeast/16nuke.html?r=1&scp=85&sq=iran&stnyt&oref=
login; see also Dafna Linzer, Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/
content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020702126.html.
90. Lee Glendinning, Iran 'Six Months From Mass Uranium Enrichment',
GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/20/iran.
leeglendinning.
91. ANTONY H. CORDESMAN & KHALID R. AL-RODHAN, IRAN'S WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: THE REAL AND POTENTIAL THREAT 66 (2006).
92. Steven Lee Myers, Bush Urges Unity Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/world/middleeast/14prexy.
htnl?r =1&scp=28&sq=iran&st=nyt&oref=login.
93. Corsi, supra note 76, at 37-38;David Isenberg, The Fuel Behind Iran's Nuclear
Drive, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/MiddleEast/
GH24Ak02.html.
94. YouTube: Dariush Zahedi, Emergency Summit to Prevent War With Iran,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbtskLn3qVw (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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with nuclear energy so that it may enjoy more oil profits.
Further, Iran, unlike Israel, has signed the NPT. The majority of
the parties to the treaty believe that Iran has a right to uranium
enrichment under Article IV of the NPT as evinced by the 144
countries in the Non-Aligned Movement issuing a statement on
May 30, 2006, which upheld Iran's right to uranium enrichment.97
Although some argue that if Iran is serious about negotiations over
its nuclear program it should simply give up its centrifuges,98 such
an argument ignores the fact that Iran has the right to have these
centrifuges to produce nuclear energy. Denying Iran such a right
would alter the terms of the treaty, which many non-nuclear
countries would likely be hesitant to accept unless the nuclear
countries live up to their commitment under Article VI of the treaty
and begin dismantling their own nuclear arsenals.99
Second, Israel's reliance on the "point of no return" theory is
misplaced. According to some Israeli officials, once Iran learns how
to enrich uranium in large quantities and to high degrees, it will
have passed a "point of no return" where Iran will have acquired
the necessary know-how, after which it will be next to impossible to
stop Tehran from going nuclear. According to nonproliferation
experts, this concept is an arbitrary measure used for political
purposes.100 John Wolfsthal, a former senior Energy Department
official, explains that the "'point of no return' concept is not a valid
one, and the voices in America and in Israel using it to push for a
quick solution are misleading." 101 He goes on to assert that the
concept is a "made-up term by those who want immediate
action." 102
Third, Iran, who has proven to be a rational player in its
dealings with Israel, 103 realizes that weaponizing its nuclear
97. Mark Heinrich, Iran: No Global Consensus Against It Despite Pressure, REUTERS,
June 14, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/538138/
iran-no-global-consensus-against-it despite-pressure/index.html.
98. Corsi, supra note 76, at 56.
99. Heinrich, supra note 97; Parsi, supra note 53, at 267.




103. Telephone interview by Trita Parsi with Efraim Halevy, former Mossad
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program would not be beneficial in the long run. In fact, "[als long
as the Middle East is kept as free as possible from nuclear weapons,
Iran will enjoy a conventional supremacy vis-A-vis its neighbors
because of its size and resources." 104 If Iran weaponizes its nuclear
program, "it will risk sparking a nuclear arms race [throughout the
region] that may lead small states such as Bahrain and Kuwait to opt
for a nuclear capability as well." 05 In a nuclear Middle East, "Iran
will lose its conventional [regional] superiority." 106 It is in fact
partly these dynamics that motivated Iran and Egypt to join forces
in the 1970s to keep the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.107
Additionally, there are indicators suggesting that Tehran does
not seem to feel as though it needs a nuclear deterrent against Israel.
As Iran's U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif explains, "[firom the
government's perspective, weapons of mass destruction would not
constitute a deterrence against Israel. We have other deterrences
that work better."108 One of the deterrences is Iran's asymmetric
capabilities in Lebanon, of which "[t]he effectiveness.., was
demonstrated during the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of
2006."109 As will be demonstrated below, however, the degree of
control that Iran holds over Hezbollah is far from absolute.
Fourth, it is important to distinguish between actual armament
from the capacity to arm. While Israel has not been able to prove
that Iran is seeking the former, there is a good amount of evidence
from neutral sources indicating that Iran is interested in the latter.
ElBaradei has suggested that Iran's preferred option is to have the
capability to make weapons without having to do so.110 He has
mentioned that Iranians know that mastering uranium enrichment
is "a deterrent" in and of itself and that "they don't need a weapon
[because enrichment] sends a message." Qualifying his comments,
the IAEA director went on to argue:




108. Interview by Trita Parsi with Javad Zarif, former Iran Ambassador, U.N.,
(April 1, 2004).
109. Parsi, supra note 53, at 269.
110. Interview by Margaret Warner with Gen. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director,
IAEA, in Wash. D.C. (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org
/newshour/bb/ international /jan-june04/elbaradei_3 -18.html.
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[W]hat I mean is... if you have an enrichment program or a
reprocessing program, which means you can produce uranium...
you are really sending a message that we know how to do it,
should we decide to make a weapon. We don't need... to
develop a weapon, but I am telling you-you know, the world,
my neighbors, that I can do it."'
2. Proving Iran's Capability to Weaponize its Nuclear Program Does
Not Satisfy the Imminent Necessity Prong
Standing alone, a capability is not a threat.11 2 To prove a
genuine threat, and certainly to prove an imminent threat, Israel
must demonstrate capability in addition to intention.11 3 In other
words, Israel must show that Iran will use nuclear weapons against
Israel if Iran becomes a nuclear power. Many have come to take it
for granted that Iran wishes to destroy Israel and will do so at the
first opportunity. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Iran
is "committed to the destruction of the Jewish state and there is
nothing in the record to contradict that impression." 114 However, a
careful analysis of Iran's true intentions towards Israel soundly
disproves such claims.
There is no question that Iran has adopted harsh rhetoric
against Israel after the fall of the Shah. When coupled with Iran's
nuclear program and Shahab III missile, which can reach Israel,1'
5
such harsh words have understandably not been taken lightly.
However, Iranian rhetoric against Israel does not necessarily
manifest Iran's true intentions.
As a side note, the Shahab III missile was developed as a result
of Iran's desire to "fix [a] hole in their defenses" when it realized
that it was vulnerable to Iraq's ballistic missiles throughout the Iran-
Iraq war"16 rather than out of a motivation to eliminate Israel.
Further, Iranian leadership has explicitly pointed out that
development of the Shahab III missile has "always been a defensive
111. Id.
112. Vatanparast, supra note 19, at 800.
113. See id.
114. Corsi, supra note 76, at 56.
115. Charles P. Vick, Shahab-3, 3A/ Zelzal-3, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-3.htm.
116. Parsi, supra note 53, at 144.
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strategy." u 7 Despite ten years of having this capability,118 Iran has
not used this missile against Israel.
One statement that has stood out is President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's foolish declaration that the Israeli regime "must be
eliminated from the pages of history." 119 This statement rightfully
drew quite a bit of controversy given its clearly provocative nature.
However, for reasons pointed out below, it should not be
interpreted to mean that the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to
destroy Israel.
When confronted to explain the true intentions of the Islamic
Republic regarding Israel, Ahmadinejad noted that the solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian problem should be a popular referendum
rather than an Iranian military attack against Israel.120 Further, there
have been arguments regarding the accuracy of the translation. In
fact, Persian language experts from across the political spectrum
argue that what Ahmadinejad actually said was "this regime that is
occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time."1 2'
Further, the statement should be viewed in its proper context in
order to appropriately understand its meaning. As Professor
Virginia Tilley argues:
[Ahmadinejad] was being prophetic, not threatening. He was
citing Imam Khomeini, who said this line in the 1980s (a period
when Israel was actually selling arms to Iran, so apparently it was
not viewed as so ghastly then). Mr. Ahmadinejad had just
reminded his audience that the Shah's regime, the Soviet Union,
and Saddam Hussein had all seemed enormously powerful and
immovable, yet the first two had vanished almost beyond recall
and the third now languished in prison. So, too, the "occupying
regime" in Jerusalem would someday be gone. His message was,
117. Interview by Trita Parsi with Mahmood Sariolghalam, Professor, Shahid
Beheshti University in Tehran (Aug. 18, 2004).
118. Vick, supra note 115.
119. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President, Speech at World Without
Zionism Conference in Tehran (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.memri.org/
bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP101305.
120. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, Speech at Columbia University
(Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=
va&aid =6889.
121. Virginia Tilley, Putting Words in Ahmadinejad's Mouth, COUNTERPUNCH, Aug.
28, 2006, http://www.counterpunch.org/tilley08282006.html.
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in essence, "This too shall pass."'
Professor Tilley goes on to assert that the phrase "eliminating the
occupying regime" should not be understood as the "destruction of
Israel." 123  The word "'[r]egime' refers to governance, not
populations or cities. 'Zionist regime' is the government of Israel
and its system of laws, which have annexed Palestinian land and
hold millions of Palestinians under military occupation. " 124
Dr. Jerome Corsi points to other indications of Iranian hostility
towards Israel. Dr. Corsi claims that even former Iranian President
Khatami has threatened to attack Anglo-Saxon civilization: "Our
missiles are now ready to strike at their civilization, and as soon as
the instructions arrive from Supreme Leader Khamenei, we will
launch our missiles at their cities and installations." 125 A close look
at the source Dr. Corsi uses to support this contention, however,
indicates that former President Khatami never uttered the
statement. Rather, it was a Revolutionary Guard Intelligence
theoretician who was criticizing Khatami's attempts to find common
ground with the West.126 As will be demonstrated below, there is
insufficient evidence that Khamenei, who actually has authority
over the armed forces of Iran (unlike the Revolutionary Guard
Intelligence theoretician, Khatami, or Ahmadinejad), will order such
an attack. Dr. Corsi's misquote is quite irresponsible as it has been
cited by other scholars such as Alan Dershowitz as justification for
an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran.
127
To help justify a preemptive Israeli strike on Iran, Dershowitz
argues that Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said to be the number
two man in Iran,
has threatened Israel with nuclear destruction, boasting that an
Iranian attack would kill as many as five million Jews [and] that
even if Israel retaliated by dropping its own nuclear bombs, Iran
would probably lose only fifteen million people, which he said




125. Corsi, supra note 76, at 42.
126. The Middle Eastern Res. Inst., Iran's Revolutionary Guard Official Threatens
Suicide Operations, (May 28, 2004), http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?
Page=archives &Area=sd&ID = SP72304.
127. Dershowitz, supra note 76, at 175.
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world.
128
Dershowitz, however, ignores the fact that the Iranian government
has insisted that Israel had "distorted the statements by Head of
Iranian Expediency Council Ali Akbar Rafsanjani."129 It is also
important to point out that his remarks were "immediately met with
a barrage of harsh criticism from Iranians." 130 Further, in looking at
Rafsanjani's actual statements, one does not find an express threat
against Israel. Rafsanjani was quoted to have said,
If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the
arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would
face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not
leave anything in Israel but the same thing would just produce
damages in the Muslim world. 131
While Rafsanjani's calculations may be morbid, they do not threaten
Israel with a first strike attack. He uses the word "stalemate," which
makes it more likely that the statement should be interpreted to
mean that Israel will no longer have a nuclear umbrella over the
Middle East if Iran has a nuclear weapon, more so than that Iran
will attack Israel if Iran comes to possess a nuclear weapon.
Dershowitz and Corsi have also pointed to Khamenei's
statement declaring that "[w ] e must have two bombs ready to go in
January [2005] or you are not Muslims" 132 to support the contention
that Israel must preemptively strike Iran.133 The fact that Iran has
neither attacked Israel nor obtained a nuclear weapon after four
years have passed since the "deadline" demonstrates the dangers of
taking rhetoric at face value. It also reminds us of the rash thinking
that led to the premature U.S. invasion of Iraq based on the theory
of possession of WMDs that turned out to be false. These
indications reinforce the necessity to reject presumptions of the
128. Id.
129. Iran Denies Willing to Nuke Down Israel, IRAN PRESS SERV., http://www.iran-
pressservice.com/articles_2001/dec_2001/israel iran nulethreat_ 301201.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
130. Id.
131. Rafsanjani Says Muslim Should Use Nuclear Weapon Against Israel, IRAN PRESS
SERV., Dec. 14, 2001, http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/dec- 2001/
rafsanjani-nuke threats_141201.htm.
132. Corsi, supra note 76, at 19; Dershowitz, supra note 76, at 175 (citing Iranian
Leader Wants Nukes in 4 Months, WORLDNETDAILY, Oct. 02, 2004, http:
//www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=40723).
133. See generally Corsi, supra note 76; Dershowitz, supra note 76, at 174-89.
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"mad mullah" complex and analyze the issue more critically.
To ascertain true intentions, it is necessary to look beyond mere
rhetoric and focus on the actions behind them. Many are quick to
forget that "[flor years, Israel remained willing to do business with
Iran, even though the mullahs in Tehran were screaming for an end
to the Zionist entity." 134 In fact, when "Iranian leaders [were calling]
for Israel's destruction in the 1980s, Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in
Washington lobbied the United States not to pay attention to the
Iranian rhetoric... [even though] Iran's revolutionary Islamist
zeal ... in the 1980s" was at least as harsh as it is today.135 Also in
the 1980s, Iran bought 80% of its weapons from Israel to fight
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.136 Between 1980 and 1983 alone, Iran
bought over $500 million worth of arms from Israel.1 37
It has generally been the peaceful Iranian rhetoric that has been
supported by Iranian actions. President Khatami's Administration
declared that "[w]e don't seek hostilities with anyone." 138 Following
this remark, the Khatami Administration, with the full backing of
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, offered Israel a deal in
which Iran would (1) significantly moderate its position on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (2) completely avoid confronting or
challenging the Jewish State, and (3) would pressure groups such as
Hezbollah to refrain from provoking Israel; in return for Israel (1)
ceasing its opposition to an U.S.-Iran rapprochement, and (2)
recognizing Iran's role in the region.139 Rather than seizing this
opportunity, Israel rejected the offer. 140  Meanwhile, the
134. Clyde Haberman, Israel Focuses on the Threat Beyond the Arabs - in Iran, N. Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/08/
weekinreview/the-world-israel-focuses-on-the-threat-beyond-the-arabs-in-
iran.html? scp=2&sq=Israel&st=nyt.
135. Parsi, supra note 53, at xi.
136. Nader Entessar, Israel and Iran's National Security, 4 J. S. ASIAN & MIDDLE E.
STUD. 8 (2004).
137. Parsi, supra note 53, at 107.
138. Interview by Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi with Ambassador Thomas R.
Pickering, 2 AIC INSIGHT. 1, 9 (2004), available at http://www.american-
iranian.org/pubs/aicinsight/insightsept04.pdf.
139. Interview by Trita Parsi with Masoud Eslami of the Iranian Foreign
Ministry, Tehran, (Aug. 23, 2004); Interview by Trita Parsi with adviser to the
Iranian National Security Advisor, (August 2004), Tehran; Interview by Trita Parsi
with Iranian Foreign Ministry official, Tehran, (August 2004).
140. Parsi, supra note 53, at 256; Interview by Trita Parsi with Menashe Amir,
head of Israeli Radio's Persian Service, Jerusalem, (October 24, 2004).
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neoconservatives in Washington and hard-liners in the Israeli
government "redoubled their efforts to convince the White House to
target Iran."14 1
This behavior begs the question as to why Iran has adopted
such harsh rhetoric towards Israel. To answer this question, one
must look at the geopolitical realities that Iran faces. Iran has used
anti-Israeli rhetoric mainly to gain popularity in the Arab street142
and to ensure regime survival.143 The revolutionaries reasoned that
"[tihe more anti-Israeli Iran appeared, the more sympathy it would
win among the Arab populations and the more difficult it would be
for the Arab governments to challenge and oppose Iran."144 Reva
Bhalla supports this analysis, noting that "Iran is trying to boost its
standing in the region by embarrassing moderate Arab
governments." She goes on to argue that,
[i]t basically makes Iran stand apart from the Arab regimes. And
note that the Arab regimes are the most silent on this issue. Most
are quite happy seeing Hamas contained, [they] really have no
problem with the Palestinians being contained in the region by the
Israelis. It's that huge disconnect between what you hear in the
Arab street and what you see being actually discussed within
these regimes. And so Iran is trying to exploit that.145
It is imperative to recognize that "Iranian slogans were rarely
followed up with concrete actions." 146 Further, "Iran is not driven
by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to
preserve its regime and establish itself as a strategic regional power,
vis-A-vis both Israel and the Sunni Arab states."1 47
The recent 2008-2009 Israeli invasion of Gaza exemplifies the
argument that Iran's anti-Israeli rhetoric is mere talk and not a
141. Parsi, supra note 53, at 251-52.
142. Parsi, supra note 53, at 101 ("[T]he Arab street" refers to the Arab
populations that are not members of the ruling elite.").
143. Id.
144. Id. at 102.
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manifestation of its true intentions. Khamenei declared that
"anyone killed while defending Palestinians in Gaza against Israeli
attacks would be considered a martyr" but curiously refused to
contribute troops to assist Hamas with the excuse that Iran's "hands
are tied."148 Iran's stance, although ideological at first glance, is in
fact driven by geopolitical interests. Former President Rafsanjani
pointed out that if ideology were the main concern of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iranians would have supported the Muslim
Chechens against the Russian Federation but did not do so because
it was not in Iran's interests. 149
Even Ahmadinejad's most aggressive comments regarding
Israel stem from strategic motivations rather than an obsession to
destroy Israel. Ahmadinejad's camp has "argued that Iran should
enlarge the conflict and make Israel a critical and visible part of the
international debate on Iran's nuclear program." 50 Indeed, "[b]y
putting into question issues Israel had managed to settle over the
past twenty years, Ahmadinejad's camp hopes to win the
discontented Arab street and reveal the weakness of the pro-U.S.
Arab regimes, which would be pressured and embarrassed. " 151 As
noted earlier, it was hardly to demonstrate an intention to destroy
Israel.
Ahmadinejad's rhetoric serves yet another purpose. By
focusing the Iranian public's attention on Israel, it distracts Iranians
from domestic issues that have plagued Iran for quite some time.
Such issues include the lack of political transparency, a weak and
inefficient economy, the lack of opportunity for youth, and rampant
corruption. Ahmadinejad's remarks then, serve more to promote
regime survival rather than to destroy Israel.152
Finally, Iran has behaved in a relatively rational manner when
conducting its foreign affairs. An Iranian nuclear attack against
Israel then, would be very much out of character. 153 This is so for
148. Iran Bans Volunteers From Fighting Israel, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/O1/08/ap/middleeast/
main4708005 .shtml.
149. Phone interview by Trita Parsi with Abbas Maleki, Iranian deputy foreign
minister in the early and mid-1990s, Geneva, Uan. 27, 2005).
150. Parsi, supra note 53, at 264.
151. Id.
152. Interview with Professor Dariush Zahedi, Berkeley, Cal. (Sept. 28, 2005).
153. Parsi, supra note 53, at 270.
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three reasons. First, Iran understands that there is no way it could
take out Israel's second-strike capabilities, and that such an attack
would expose Iran to a fierce Israeli nuclear retaliation 54 from the
air, sea and/or land.155 Second, such an attack would certainly
damage Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam, which would
completely undermine Iran's legitimacy as an Islamic State.15 6
Third, an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would likely kill more
Palestinians than Israelis and would cripple Iran's reputation as the
champion of the Palestinian cause, which it has used to win the
Arab street as argued above.1 57
3. Claims That Iran Wishes to Murder All Jews are Unfounded
Many top Israeli officials, including President Shimon Peres
and Prime Minister Netanyahu, have compared the current Iranian
regime to the genocidal Nazi regime of the 1930s and have even
gone so far as to argue that Iran is preparing for another
Holocaust.1 58  Various scholars have concurred with these
statements. 159 This has been one of Israel's primary justifications for
pursuing such a hostile stance towards Iran. However, Israel has
not produced nearly enough evidence to suggest that this is really
true especially given the fact that the largest Jewish community in
the Middle East resides in Iran (with the obvious exception of
Israel).160 The Iranian government has taken official steps to protect
154. Trita Parsi: Israel and Iran: Irresolvable Conflict?, ISRAEL POL'Y F., June 7, 2006,
available at http://hnn.us/roundup/comments/26427.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2009); See e.g., John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND US
FOREIGN POLICY 72 (2007).
155. See Dershowitz, supra note 76, at 183; Peter Beaumont & Conal Urquhart,
Israel Deploys Nuclear Arms In Submarines, GUARDIAN, Oct. 12, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/12/israel1; Jericho 3, http://www.
missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.58/missile detail.asp (last visited Feb. 18,
2009); F-16 Falcon, http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/ isnukes.html#f16 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009).
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdhBwMPYIO&feature=related (last visited
Sept. 29, 2009).
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the Iranian Jewish community as seen in Khomeini issuing a fatwa16l
declaring that Jews in Iran are to be protected. 62
The Iranian government has kept its promise of protecting its
Jewish population. Iran's forty synagogues, Hebrew schools, the
Jewish library, Jewish hospitals and cemeteries have not been
touched by the Iranian government.1 63 In fact, Maurice Mohtamed,
the Jewish member of the Iranian parliament, has been quite
outspoken in his condemnation of Ahmadinejad's comments on the
Holocaust.1 64 Haroun Yashayaei, chairman of Iran's Jewish Council,
has been similarly critical of Ahmadinejad's statements.165
Additionally, few Iranian Jews take Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel
rhetoric seriously and they point to the fact that little has changed
for Iranian Jews under his administration.166
Further, Ayatollah Khamenei has forbidden all Iranian officials,
including Ahmadinejad, from repeating Ahmadinejad's spiteful
Holocaust denying remarks.167 Khamenei's ban manifested itself
during Ahmadinejad's visit to New York to address the U.N.
General Assembly in 2006168 and during Ahmadinejad's speech at
Columbia University in 2007.169
In sum, Israel has no hard evidence to demonstrate that Iran is
preparing to renew a Nazi Holocaust. It is particularly important to
not take Israeli accusations at face value as Israel's credibility has
suffered greatly in the past several decades. Suspicion of Israeli
credibility is based off of a few cases in particular.170 First, Israel
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/5367892.stm.
161. An Islamic religious decree.
162. Barbara Demick, Iran: Life of Jews Living in Iran, FOUND. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SEPHARDIC STUD. AND CULTURE, http://www.sephardicstudies
.org/iran.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
163. Parsi, supra note 53, at 9.
164. Ewen MacAskill, Simon Tisdall, & Robert Tait, Iran's Jews Learn to Live with
Ahmadinejad, GUARDIAN, June 27, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world /2006
/jun/27/iran.ewenmacaskill.
165. Sadeq Saba, Iran Jews Express Holocaust Shock, BBC, Feb. 11, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4705246.stm.
166. See Harrison, supra note 160.
167. Parsi, supra note 53, at 265.
168. Anderson Cooper, News Correspondent, CNN, Transcript of 360 Degrees
aired on Sept. 21, 2006, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0609/
21/acd.01.html.
169. Ahmadinejad, supra note 120.
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concealed its nuclear weapon production throughout the 1960s.171
More recently, Israel, as a result of mounting evidence, has had to
admit that it did indeed use white phosphorous in its 2008-2009
invasion of the Gaza Strip despite having had categorically denied
doing so initially.
172
Further, Israel's justifications for its 2008-2009 invasion of the
Gaza Strip have been seriously questioned not only by critics of
Israeli foreign policy but also by top officials such as Brigadier
General (Ret.) Shmuel Zakai, a former commander of the IDF's Gaza
Division, Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon's senior adviser, Ephraim
Halevy, the former head of Mossad and Sharon's national security
adviser, and Anthony Cordesman, one of the most reliable military
analysts of the Middle East, and a friend of Israel' 73
Given such weighty evidence to the contrary, Israel's baseless
claims that Iran is a genocidal regime are not sufficient to justify an
Israeli preemptive strike against Iran.
4. The Danger That Iran Will Share a Nuclear Weapon
With Terrorist Groups is Extremely Remote
Even accepting the fact that Iran will not directly launch a
nuclear attack against Israel, there is still the issue of whether Iran
will use non-state actors to launch such an attack if Iran became a
nuclear power.174 At most, however, this is an overstated danger for
two reasons. First, not only has Iran refused to share its chemical or
biological weapons with groups such as Hezbollah, "Tehran has
fully grasped the meaning of the signal-if any of Iran's proxies
necessarily greater or lesser than Israeli credibility. It is beyond the scope or
objective of this paper to explore which side is more trustworthy. The author
points out these instances that put Israeli credibility into question merely to point
out that Israel's arguments proposing an attack on Iran should pass a level of
scrutiny before being accepted as necessarily true. As will be evident below, the
question of whether Iran may invoke the right of preemption against Israel shall
undergo the same level of scrutiny.
171. Should Israel Give Up Its Nukes?, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/09/opinion/oe-bisharat9; see generally,
Seymour M. Hersh, THE SAMSON OPTION (1991).
172. Israel admits using white phosphorous in attacks on Gaza, TIMESONLINE, Jan. 24,
2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle-east/article
5575070 .ece.
173. Henry Siegmen, Israel's Lies, London Review of Books, January 29, 2009,
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n02/sieg01_.htnl.
174. Mearsheimer, supra note 154, at 72.
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attack Israel with a nuclear warhead, Israel would destroy Iran."175
Iran "could never be sure the transfer would remain undetected or
that they would not be blamed and punished afterward."176
Second, if Iran were to share a nuclear weapon with non-state
actors, such groups would no longer have to rely on Iran for
support. Iran would effectively lose a great deal of influence over
these non-state actors. Given Iran's tendency "to view all other
actors as potential competitors" and its ambition "to become the
region's undisputed power," it is unlikely that Iran's
"Machiavellian" leadership would "commit such an irrevocable and
devastating mistake" as to share such sensitive technology with
non-state actors.177 If such an exchange were to occur, Iran "would
no longer control how the weapons might be used and they could
never be certain that [Israel or the United States] would not
incinerate them if either country merely suspected that [Iran] had
provided terrorists with the ability to carry out [a] WMD attack."178
5. There is Insufficient Evidence to Link Iran to Terrorist Attacks
Against Israel
Although many point to the tragic 1994 bombings of the
headquarters of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos
Aires as evidence of Iranian-funded terrorism against Israel, there
was insufficient evidence to convict anyone of the attack. In fact, the
Israelis privately "recognized that despite Iran's support of
Palestinian rejectionist groups such as Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad ... Iran wasn't the root of the terror that Israel endured" in the
spring of 1994.179 However, the Rabin government, who was at the
time engaged in peace talks with the Palestinians, recognized that
pursuing peace would be next to impossible if Israel simultaneously
accused Palestinians of committing terrorism. Iran, although only
partially responsible, was a convenient target to demonize. 180
Terrorist attacks in Israel in the Spring of 1996 exemplify this
point. Between February 25 and March 4, four major terrorist
attacks hit the cities of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Ashkelon, killing
175. Parsi, supra note 53, at 270.
176. Mearsheimer, supra note 154, at 72-73.
177. Parsi, supra note 53, at 270-71.
178. Mearsheimer, supra note 154, at 73.
179. Parsi, supra note 53, at 179.
180. Id. at 180.
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fifty-nine Israeli civilians. Then Prime Minister Shimon "Peres
immediately placed the blame on Tehran... [even though Hamas]
publicly claimed responsibility and gave the reason for the
bombings as vengeance for the Israeli assassination of Yehya
Ayyash, a high-ranking Hamas operative." 181 In fact, two years
later, President Khatami condemned terrorism against Israelis in an
interview with CNN.182
6. The Presence of Alternative Means of Addressing the Conflict
Prevents Israel from Demonstrating Imminent Necessity
Despite the harsh rhetoric, Iran has been quite persistent in
opening up to diplomacy to resolve the nuclear issue in particular
and the tensions with Israel in general. For example, Ali Larijani,
the former nuclear negotiator, has said that Iran is willing to give
reassurances that no nuclear material would be diverted to a
weapons program, although he (rightfully) insisted that Iran has the
right to enrich uranium under the NPT.183 Further, Israel has
persistently rejected Iranian offers of diplomacy regarding issues
like Iran's nuclear program. Examples include the Barak
government rejecting Iranian overtures in 2000,184 and more
importantly, Iran's offer to Israel in 2003 as mentioned above.
Not only would an Israeli preemptive strike be illegal as a result
of failing to satisfy the imminent necessity requirement, such a
strike poses three practical complications. First, in addition to the
Israeli Air Force's current inability to reach and successfully destroy
Iran's known facilities, there is also the problem of dealing with
potentially unknown nuclear sites. 185 Even in a perfect military
operation, "Iran will likely retain its nuclear capability" as "the
bombing campaign would at best set back the Iranian program no
more than five years" and provide "Tehran with the opportunity to
legitimately withdraw from the [NPTI."186 After withdrawing from
181. Id. at 193.
182. Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, CNN, Jan. 7,
1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/O7/iran/interview.httm.
183. Iran Defiant on Nuclear Programme, BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007,
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6378289.stm.
184. Parsi, supra note 53, at 218.
185. Seymour Hersh, The Coming Wars, THE NEW YORKER, JAN. 24, 2005, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/01/24/050124fafact.
186. Parsi, supra note 53, at xiii.
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the NPT, Iran will still retain its nuclear know-how of the
enrichment process unless the Israeli air strike manages to take out
all of Iran's nuclear scientists.
187
Second, not only would such a strike result in enormous
civilian casualties, it would also fail in neutralizing the Iranian
nuclear program. Because it is a Jewish state, Israel would have a
particularly difficult time justifying its likely killing of Iranian Jews
in such an attack as Iran has the largest Jewish population in the
Middle East outside of Israel.188
Third, Iran's response to such an attack would prove disastrous
for both Israeli and U.S. interests. If attacked, Iran is capable of
striking against both U.S. and Israeli interests primarily through
intervention in Iraq, encouraging Hezbollah to attack Israel and
closing off the Strait of Hormuz, which would cut off two-fifths of
the global oil supply and cause a crippling global recession.18 9
C. Iran's Support of Hezbollah and Hamas Does Not Provide
Israel the Right to Strike Iran Under Article 51
Some claim that because terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and
Hamas are merely Iranian proxies that carry out the Islamic
Republic's will, Israel should be afforded the right to strike Iran.190
This argument is without merit for two reasons: (1) Hezbollah and
Hamas are not mere proxies of Iran; (2) the demonstration of Iranian
support for such groups is, standing alone, insufficient to justify an
Article 51 defense.
1. Hezbollah and Hamas Are Not Mere Proxies of Iran
Hezbollah and Hamas are not mere proxies of Iran but are
rather independent organizations. Although the degree of control
Iran wields over Hezbollah is not likely to be absolute, 91 it is a card
that Iran can and has played. 192 One should be careful, however, not
187. Id.
188. The Jews of Iran, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/
jsource/anti-semitism/iranjews.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
189. Zahedi, supra note 94.
190. See generally, Corsi, supra note 76; Dershowitz, supra note 76, at 174-89.
191. William 0. Beeman, Examining Iran's ties to Hezbollah, IN THESE TIMES, Aug.
15, 2006, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2790.
192. ROBERT GRACE & ANDREW MANDELBAUM, UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-
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to overstate Iran's influence over Hezbollah as its control has been
"steadily declining since approximately 1996." 193 While financial
support "does continue to come 'from Iran,' to support
Hezbollah," 194 it is not clear how much of this comes from the
Iranian state and how crucial these Iranian funds are to Hezbollah's
survival.195 In fact, "Hezbollah has taken on a life of its own. Even
if all Iranian financial and logistical support were cut off, Hezbollah
would not only continue, it would thrive." 196
Iranian-Hamas ties are even more obscure. Some Israeli
officials argue that Iranian ties with Hamas are so strong that Iran
has not only trained and armed Hamas fighters but that Iran could
have penetrated the Israeli cordon around the Gaza Strip to provide
arms to Hamas in the 2008-2009 conflict.197 Such allegations are
controversial, however, as George Joffe, a Middle East expert has
noted, "Quite how Iran could have maintained those sorts of
contacts seems to me very difficult to understand." 198 Others have
characterized the relationship as "more theatrical than practical," as
whatever aid Iran gives to Hamas pales in comparison to Saudi
Arabian aid to Hamas.199
2. Proof of Iranian Support is Insufficient as a Matter of Law to
Justify an Article 51 Self-defense Strike
Even if Iranian-Hezbollah and Iranian-Hamas links are strong,
Israeli demonstration of Iranian support for these groups is not
sufficient to provide Israel with the justification to invoke Article 51
self-defense against Iran. Some may be tempted to argue that Iran's
support of these groups is an act of war. The logical extension of
such an argument is that Israel must respond to an attack that has
already transpired rather than preempt one that is likely to happen.
understanding-iran-hezbollah-connection (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
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Although these groups have engaged in open conflict with Israel,
their actions cannot be attributed to Iran.
The evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
Israel, merely demonstrates that Iran provides assistance to these
groups in the form of weapons or logistics. Nevertheless, Iranian
fighters have not carried out acts of severe armed force against
Israel amounting to an actual armed attack conducted by regular
forces. 200 Iran's actions then, do not qualify as an "armed attack"
against Israel under Article 51 as interpreted in the ICJ's Nicaragua
opinion. Therefore, Israel lacks the grounds to invoke the right of
Article 51 self-defense against Iran.
V. An Iranian Attack Against Israel Would Be Illegal
A. Iran Bears the Burden of Proof to Demonstrate Legality
Pursuant to the rule established above,201 if Iran wishes to
conduct a preemptive or Article 51 strike against Israel, the burden
of proof is on Iran's shoulders to prove that it has met the legal
requirements.
B. Iran Is Unable to Satisfy the Imminent Necessity Requirement
to Justify a Preemptive Attack
Although Iran has threatened retaliation if attacked, Iran has
not explicitly made any arguments to support a preemptive strike
against Israel. 202 It is for this reason that this section will differ from
the previous in that it will analyze potential arguments that Iran
could make to support a preemptive strike against Israel. Applying
the same level of scrutiny as above demonstrates that Iran is unable
to make a case to invoke the right of preemption against Israel.
1. Israel's Threats of Overt Military Action Against Iran's Nuclear
Sites Do Not Create Imminent Necessity
In examining Iran's case regarding imminent necessity, it is
interesting to note that Israel's threats towards Iran have been far
200. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 7.
201. A party which advances a point of fact in support of its claim must establish
that fact.
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more direct than Iran's threats towards Israel. In fact, Israeli
officials have clearly and unambiguously warned that Israel may
resort to preemptive force against Iran's nuclear reactors. 203
Unlike Iran, Israel's conduct has seemed to conform with its
rhetoric. In 2007, a secret Israeli plan to strike Iranian nuclear
reactors at Natanz with nuclear bunker busters was disclosed to the
media.204 The report had the caveat that the nuclear-tipped bunker-
busters would only be used if a conventional attack was ruled out
and if the United States declined to intervene.205 In June 2008, Israel
conducted a major military exercise that U.S. officials speculated
was a kind of dress rehearsal for a potential bombing attack on
Natanz.20
6
Not only has Israel demonstrated an intention to strike Iran's
nuclear facilities, it has also sought out the capabilities to do so. In
the past year, Israel has requested from the United States two
pertinent pieces of military equipment: (1) new Boeing 767 refueling
jets that would be required to reach Iran by air;20 7 and (2) bunker-
buster bombs that would be required to take out Iranian
underground nuclear facilities.208 These are the same bunker-buster
bombs that the abovementioned 2007 Natanz plan demanded.
The above threats seem conditional. Skeptics may argue that if
Iran does not wish to suffer an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities,
it should simply refrain from weaponizing its nuclear program and
maintain it for peaceful purposes only. Such skeptics would go on
203. Parsi, supra note 53, at 283 (discussing Project Daniel); Anne Gearan, Israel
on Iran: Anything it Takes to Stop Nukes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 27, 2009, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/28/israel-on-iran-anythingi-n
245953.html.
204. Uzi Mahnaimi & Sarah Baxter, Revealed: Israel Plans Nuclear Strike On Iran,
SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
articlel290331.ece.
205. Id.
206. Israel Military Exercise May Be Rehearsal for Attack on Iran Nuclear Facility,
NAT'L TERROR ALERT, June 20, 2008, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/
updates/2008/06/20/israel-military-exercise-may-be-rehearsal-for-attack-on-iran-
nuclear-faciity/.
207. See Yaakov Lappin, U.S. Rejects Barak's Boeing 767 Request, THE JERUSALEM
POST, August 20, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename
=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1219218601145.
208. See Amos Harel & Aluf Benn, Israel Asks U.S. for Arms, Air Corridor to Attack
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to argue that because Iran does not wish to have a nuclear weapon
but more likely the capability to build one, then there is no cause for
concern.
However, Israel has clearly expressed that it will not tolerate
Iran to have such a capability. The Bush Administration's attempts
to reach an equitable solution with Iran that would allow them the
rights to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes as provided by the
NPT while preventing them from weaponizing is an excellent case
in point. In 2005, AIPAC fiercely opposed the Bush
Administration's expressed support for a proposal that would
permit Iran to continue its nuclear development as long as
enrichment took place in Russia.2 9 At a frank briefing on Capitol
Hill, an Israeli senior diplomat explained that there is no kind of
inspections regime that would make the Israelis feel comfortable
with an Iranian civilian nuclear program.210 The only guarantee
acceptable to Israel, he went on, is "the debilitation of Iran's
industrial base." The diplomat topped his explanation off with a
warning that if the United States does not take quick action on Iran,
Israel "may have to go it alone," suggesting that Israel might try to
destroy Iran's nuclear facilities itself.
211
As we did earlier in analyzing the Iranian threat towards Israel,
we must look at more logical reasons behind Israel's behavior rather
than accept Israeli rhetoric at face value. Israel will not take a threat
to its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East lightly. Even an Iran
that does not have nuclear weapons but merely the capabilities to
build them "will significantly damage Israel's ability to deter
militant Palestinian and Lebanese organizations." 212 A nuclear
capable Iran "would undermine Israel's military supremacy [in the
Middle East] and prevent it from dictating the parameters of peace
and pursuing unilateral peace plans." 213 "A nuclear Iran could force
Israel to accept territorial compromises with its neighbors" and
deprive Israel of its ability to negotiate from a position of strength.
214
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As a geopolitical matter, "Israel simply would not be able to afford a
nuclear rivalry with Iran and continued territorial disputes with the
Arabs at the same time." 215
In addition, if Iran were to master the fuel cycle, Washington
may be pressured into recognizing Iran as a regional power.216 Iran
would thereby gain strategic significance in the Middle East at
Israel's expense.217 Such a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is precisely
what Israel has worked tirelessly to prevent for over a decade due to
geopolitical concerns.218
As a side note, it is interesting to point out that Israeli threats
towards Iran have not only been towards Iran's nuclear program
but have encompassed Iran's regime as well. Israeli envoy Uri
Lubrani, for example, attempted to convince the Clinton
Administration to finance a coup d'etat in Iran.219
Although the evidence tends to show an Israeli intention to
target Iran's nuclear reactors, there is insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that Israel is capable of carrying out such an attack.
Therefore, Iran is unable at this time to prove imminence.
Specifically, the "Israeli Air Force still lacks the capability to take out
all of Iran's known nuclear facilities." 220 Although it is possible that
Israel may wish to launch an attack that would merely set Iran's
nuclear program back a few years, it is not entirely clear that Israel
has the capability to do this either given its attempts to purchase the
Boeing 767 refueling jets.221
Further, although the 2008 military exercises in the
Mediterranean demonstrated that Israel could reach Natanz,
without a place to land safely and refuel, such an operation without
the Boeing 767 jets is currently impossible. Although Israel could
conduct a nuclear strike against Iran, there is not enough evidence
to show that a precision attack against Iran's nuclear facilities is
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parts from the United States. Because Iran is not able to show that
Israel has the capability of carrying out such a strike against Iran,
Iran cannot satisfy the imminent necessity requirement.
2. Israel's Support of Iranian Opposition Groups Does Not Rise to
the Level of Imminent Necessity
Reliable evidence indicates that Israel has been training Kurdish
separatist movements as a means of targeting Iran.222 Israel could
use Kurdistan for "intelligence gathering and infiltration of
northwestern Iran, just as Iran was using Lebanon's southern border
to do the same in Israel." 223 There is also reason to believe that Israel
supports the Mujahedin-e Khalq ("MKO"), an Iranian opposition
group that has been designated as a terrorist organization by both
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. 224 These acts do
not create imminent necessity for two reasons: (1) evidence
regarding the extent and nature of the support is spotty especially
with respect to the MKO; (2) the mere provision of arms and
logistical support does not constitute an "armed attack" under
international law.
With respect to the first point, although it is clear that the Rabin
Administration permitted the MKO to use two Israeli satellites to
beam its TV broadcasts into Iran,225 it is not clear whether Israel has
supported the MKO militarily. Especially given MKO's recent
decline with the U.S. military disarming the group in its main base
in Iraq,226 Israel's support of the group does not rise anywhere near
the level of imminent necessity as the threat the groups poses to Iran
at this point is not likely to be formidable.
As for the support of Kurdish separatist groups, Iran being a
direct target is at this point speculative. There is not nearly enough
evidence to suggest that the threat that Israel's support of these
222. Magdi Abdelhadi, Israelis 'Train Kurdish Forces', BBC, Sept. 20, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/5364982.stm (citing BBC TV programme
Newsnight).
223. Parsi, supra note 53, at 239.
224. Scott Ritter, Iraq, Iran, and WMDs, ZNET, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/2183.
225. Who Pays for Rajavi's Satellite Programs?, IRAN INTERLINK, May 4, 2005,
http://www.iran-interlink.org/files/News3/MayO5/interlinkO4505.htm.
226. Charles Recknagel, Iraq: U.S. Forces Disarm Armed Iranian Opposition Fighters,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, May 14, 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/news/iraq/2003/05/iraq-030514-rfel-154305.htm.
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groups has towards Iran's safety and territorial sovereignty
warrants a preemptive strike against Israel.
Second, as the analysis in the previous section regarding Iran's
support of Hezbollah and Hamas demonstrates, the mere provision
of weapons and logistical support does not constitute an "armed
attack" in international law. For the same reasons that Iranian
support of Hezbollah and Hamas do not create an Israeli right to
strike Iran, Israeli support of Iranian opposition groups does not
create an Iranian right to strike Israel.
3. Reports of an Israeli Covert War Against Iran Are Insufficient to
Support a Preemptive Strike
In February 2009, U.S. intelligence sources revealed that Israel
has "launched a covert war against Iran as an alternative to direct
military strikes against Iran's nuclear program."227 Experts say that
Israel "is using hitmen, sabotage, front companies and double
agents to disrupt the regime's illicit weapons project." 228 In fact,
"Mossad was rumored to be behind the death of Ardeshire
Hassanpour, a top nuclear scientist at Iran's Isfahan uranium plant,
who died in mysterious circumstances from reported 'gas
poisoning' in 2007."229 In response, Iran has announced the arrests
"of alleged spies in an attempt to discourage double agents." 230
This covert war, however, cannot legalize an Iranian
preemptive strike against Israel. There is insufficient state practice
to support the claim that covert operations provide a government
with the justification to launch an overt strike in response. Further,
an overt Iranian attack against the Israeli mainland would not be
proportional. Counter intelligence measures are sufficient to deter
Israeli covert attempts to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program.
Additionally, an overt Iranian attack on Israel would likely be
ineffective at stopping the covert war. An Iranian preemptive attack
on Israel based on the Israeli assassination (or attempted and
alleged assassinations) of Iranian nuclear scientists would be illegal.
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4. Alternative Means of Resolution Prevent Iran From Establishing
Imminent Necessity
In addition to an inability of showing Israeli capability, Iran
lacks the evidence to conclusively prove that alternative means of
resolving the dispute would necessarily prove fruitless. This
prevents Iran from showing that the Israeli intention to attack Iran
imminently needs to be prevented. While it is true that Israel has
repeatedly rejected Iranian talk offers, there is insufficient evidence
to prove that talks are impossible and that the use of force is
imminently necessary. This is especially so given the new White
House leadership of President Barack Obama. Insisting on open
dialogue with Iran,231 President Obama may be able to promote a
diplomatic resolution between the two countries. Although the
likelihood of a finding a diplomatic solution is unclear, the fact that
it presents a viable option for Iran is sufficient to prevent Iran from
meeting its burden of imminent necessity through the absence of
alternative means of resolution.
Similar to an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran, an Iranian
preemptive strike on Israel would pose practical complications in
addition to being illegal. As stated earlier, an Iranian attack would
not neutralize Israel's second-strike capabilities. If attacked, Israel
would more than likely exercise such second-strike capabilities to
the fullest extent. A horrific regional conflict would certainly follow
in which the United States may feel compelled to intervene.
C. Israel's Covert War Does Not Provide Iran the Right to Strike
Israel Under Article 51
It is also helpful to analyze Iran's right under Article 51 in
responding to this covert war. Unlike the support that the two sides
are providing to each other's opposition groups, which as
mentioned above falls outside of the accepted international
threshold of an "armed attack," Israel is sending its own agents into
Iran to carry out armed attacks (at least with respect to the alleged
assassinations) rather than providing support to other groups that
wish to do so. However, Iran does not have the right to invoke
Article 51 self-defense against Israel in light of these facts. The ICJ
in Nicaragua indicated that a State sending "armed bands, groups,
231. Obama Says Ready to Talk to Iran, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.
reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeedl/idUSTRE50Q23220090127.
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irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State" is an "armed attack" only if these acts of
armed force "amount to an actual armed attack conducted by
regular forces 'or its substantial involvement therein."' 232
At this time, the evidence does not shed enough light on the
covert war for Iran to demonstrate that Israel has committed an
"armed attack" against Iran. Specifically, it is not clear whether the
covert war rises to the level of an armed attack that would be
conducted by regular forces. The covert war does not provide Iran
the basis to invoke Article 51 self-defense against Israel directly
although Iran certainly has the right to engage in counter
intelligence measures against foreign agents in Iran. Especially
because this option provides a viable alternative to resolving the
dispute, Iran may not invoke Article 51 self-defense against Israel on
these grounds.
VI. Conclusion
After analyzing the conflict on both sides, it is clear that: (1)
Israel cannot satisfy its burden of proof to carry out a legal
preemptive or Article 51 strike against Iran; and (2) Iran cannot
satisfy its burden of proof to carry out a legal preemptive or Article
51 strike against Israel. However, the above analysis indicates some
interesting findings. The reader should recall that to prove the
necessity requirement, a nation-state must demonstrate both intent
and capability to the point where an attack is so imminent that
nothing short of forcible action could forestall the attack.
Israel cannot meet its burden of showing an imminent necessity
because there is insufficient evidence to show that Iran intends to
launch an attack against Israel. Iran, on the other hand, although
similarly unable to meet the imminent necessity requirement, comes
closer to demonstrating an Israeli intent to attack Iran than Israel
does to show an Iranian intent to attack Israel. While Iran fails to
satisfy the capability subsection of the necessity requirement (as
they lack nuclear weapons and particularly nuclear weapons that
could reach Israel), it is interesting to note that Iran has a greater
reason to fear an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations than Israel
has to fear an Iranian nuclear attack on its population. This
conclusion demonstrates the necessity of analyzing a conflict from
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both sides to truly uncover the objective dynamics.
The reader should be mindful of the ultimate conclusions as
well as the limits of the sub-conclusion discussed in the previous
paragraph. The ultimate conclusion regarding Iran's right of
preemption against Israel is plain and simple: Because Iran is unable
to satisfy the requirements of preemption, any preemptive attack it
launches against Israel would not only be a flagrant violation of
international law but just downright foolish. The above analysis
merely indicates that Iran comes closer to meeting the isolated intent
subcategory of the imminent necessity requirement than Israel does
in its case against Iran. It is imperative to understand that even if
Iran were to fully meet the intention requirement, it would be
unable to meet the capability requirement (in that it would be
unable to eliminate Israel's capabilities of striking Iran). Further it is
difficult to imagine a scenario where the practical realities of the
situation would suggest that such a preemptive attack would be
reasonable and thus meet the proportionality prong. Moreover, it
would have to show that alternative means of resolving the dispute
would be fruitless and that immediate action would have to be
taken to prevent an Israeli strike.
The Caroline Affair and Article 51 did not establish a
continuum of when a nation-state may invoke the right of
preemptive strike against another nation-state. Rather, it set out a
threshold of two requirements, both of which must be met in order
to invoke the right. The fact that Iran comes closer to meeting one of
these prongs does not suggest that an Iranian preemptive strike
against Israel would be any less illegal than an Israeli preemptive
strike on Iran. Because both fail to meet the standard, neither may
legally invoke the right.
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